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Summary 
We examine patterns of acquiring non-native languages in a model with two languages 
and two populations with heterogeneous learning skills, where every individual faces a 
binary choice of learning the foreign language or refraining from doing so. We show 
that both interior and corner linguistic equilibria can emerge in our framework, and that 
the fraction of learners of the foreign language is higher in the country with a higher 
gross cost adjusted communicative benefit. It turns out that this observation is consistent 
with the data on language proficiency in bilingual countries such as Belgium and 
Canada. We also point out that linguistic equilibria can exhibit insufficient learning 
which opens the door for government policies that are beneficial for both populations. 
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1 Introduction
Proficiency in foreign languages has important consequences on earnings. Job opportu-
nities are more and more often open to candidates who speak several languages, though not
all languages are identical in that respect. Grenier (1985) for example, finds that in Que´bec,
it pays (a six percent wage differential) for a French-speaking Canadian to learn English,
but the opposite is not true. For the European Union similar conclusions are obtained by
Ginsburgh and Prieto (2005) whose preliminary results show that a second language (in most
cases, English) raises wages in the range from five to fifteen percent in Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, much less so in Denmark and the
Netherlands (where English is known by 75 and 70 percent of the population, respectively)
and has no effect in the United Kingdom, where a second language is not in a high demand.1
In addition to effects on earnings, a foreign language makes it possible to be immersed into a
different culture and to gain unfiltered access to its history, its arts and its literature.
Selten and Pool (1991) formulate a general model of language acquisition. They introduce
the notion of “communicative benefits,” that cover a wide range of economic, cultural and
social advantages gained by learning languages. In a paper published in this Journal, Church
and King (1993)2 construct a game theoretic model where every agent is proficient in a single
language, but can acquire the other one at a cost which is identical for all agents regardless of
their prior language knowledge. Every agent is faced with the following binary choice: to learn
the other language at a given cost, or to refrain from learning. The communicative benefit
of an individual increases with the number of those with whom she can communicate using a
common language. Thus, the equilibrium outcome depends on a network externality since the
strategic decision by an individual to learn the other language expands the communication
links for others who speak that language. The larger the number of individuals in the other
language group who learn the native tongue of an agent, the smaller the benefit from second
language acquisition for that agent. Church and King (1993) show that the equilibrium pat-
terns of language acquisition depend on the cost of learning and on the number of individuals
who initially speak each language. However, only corner solutions exist in equilibrium: either
no one learns any language in either country (if the cost of learning is sufficiently high), or
everybody learns the foreign language in one country while nobody does in the other. The
fact that only corner equilibria exist is due to the assumption that learning costs are homo-
geneous: once learning is beneficial for one agent initially endowed with some language, it is
also so for all those who speak the same language. Ginsburgh et al. (2005a) suggest that
interior equilibria may exist, but focus on the empirical implications of the model, namely,
the derivation of demand functions for languages.3
In this paper, we consider a simple model with two languages and heterogenous populations
in two countries or regions. Heterogeneity is introduced through the degree of language
aptitude which leads agents to bear individual learning costs. Agents opt to maximize their net
communicative benefit which is the difference between the communicative benefit discussed
1See also MacManus et al. (1978) and Vaillancourt et Lacroix (1985).
2See also Shy (2001).
3See also Gabszewicz and Laussel (2005) who study language learning in the framework of a multi-sided
market with a monopoly platform, and focus on the problem of language learning tariffs.
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above, and the cost of acquiring a new language. This simple model leads to a complete
description of linguistic equilibria as a function of two main parameters, the size of each
population and the unit cost of learning in each country. In this framework, both corner
equilibria (where either all the residents of a country study the foreign language or none of
them does), and interior equilibria (where some, but not all, residents of each country learn
the foreign language) may exist. An important role is played by the ratio of the population
of one country, say i, and the unit cost parameter of studying its language in country j.
This ratio represents the cost adjusted gross communicative benefit of a citizen in j from
learning language i. We show that the fraction of learners of the foreign language is higher
in the country with higher gross cost adjusted communicative benefits, an observation that is
consistent with the data on language proficiency in bilingual countries such as Belgium and
Canada.
Interior equilibria will exist only if the cost adjusted gross communicative benefits are either
large or small in both countries. However, stability of the interior equilibrium obtains only
if those benefits are relatively small in both countries. If these are large, then all individuals
will be tempted to learn the foreign language, thus making the interior equilibrium unstable.
We also turn to welfare analysis, assuming that the welfare of each country is represented
by the aggregate communicative benefits of its residents. In the non-cooperative setting, the
linguistic equilibrium will be sustained. Indeed, in the absence of intervention, the government
and citizens would make the same choice: only those with positive net communicative benefits
will learn. However, the joint optimization of communicative benefits may yield an outcome
where the extent of learning in both countries exceeds the equilibrium level. This result raises
the possibility that government policies could encourage learning of foreign languages in both
countries.
The model is described in Section 2. Section 3 turns to the characterization of linguistic
equilibria and their stability properties, as well as comparative statics results. Section 4
discusses efficiency of equilibrium solutions. Section 5 concludes and suggests further research
avenues. Proofs of the propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider two populations (regions, countries) i and j. Each population consists of
heterogeneous individuals distinguished on the basis of their learning cost described by a
parameter θ ∈ [0, 1], that can be viewed as the inverse of their ability to learn a foreign
language. Those with small θ are more apt to learn than those with high θ, and, in particular,
an individual with θ = 0 can learn the language in “her sleep”. The distribution of the aptitude
parameter is assumed to be uniform in both countries, whose populations are respectively Ni
and Nj. Individuals in each population are assumed to be unilingual and to speak their native
language, but consider acquiring the foreign language.
Let Bt(x) denote the communicative benefit of an individual t, where x represents the
number of individuals with whom she can communicate. For simplicity, we assume that
Bt(x) = B(x) = x,
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that is, the communicative benefit function is linear and common to all individuals in both
populations.
Every individual in either population is faced with two possible choices: study the language
of the other population or refrain from doing so. If a proportion αj of citizens in population
j studies language i, a citizen in population i who refrains from learning language j can
communicate with her Ni fellow citizens and with the αjNj individuals of the other population
who know language i. Thus, her communicative benefit is equal to
B(Ni + αjNj) = Ni + αjNj. (1)
Assume that every individual faces a personalized learning cost of acquiring the foreign
language, that depends on her ability: an individual in population i, whose (reversed) aptitude
is given by θ, incurs a cost Ci(θ) to learn language j. We assume that for all θ ∈ [0, 1], the
value Ci(θ) is given by
Ci(θ) = ciθ,
where ci is a positive constant. Similarly, Cj(θ) = cjθ represents the cost of learning language
i for an individual in population j. The value of parameter ci may be different from cj, so
that two individuals with the same aptitude in both populations may face different learning
costs.
The net communicative benefit B(·) for a citizen of type θ in country i who learns language
j is determined by the fact that, while she incurs a cost ciθ, this enables her to communicate
with both populations, i.e.,
B(Ni +Nj)− ciθ = Ni +Nj − ciθ. (2)
We examine a linguistic equilibrium in the game whose players are the citizens in both
countries, and study the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the game where the payoff
to every individual is given by her resulting communicative benefit net of learning costs, if
any. Note that, in equilibrium, the set of individuals who decide to learn the foreign language
in both populations represents a connected interval with respect to θ. Assuming that in the
case of indifference, an individual will study the foreign language, the interval of learners’
types always includes the type represented by point 0, as individuals with zero learning costs
are always willing to study. Thus, every equilibrium choice is determined by the highest cost
values of those individuals who study the foreign language in countries i and j, respectively.
In other words, the equilibrium is fully described by the population shares αi and αj of citizens
in countries i and j who study the other language.
Suppose that in equilibrium the measure of individuals who study the foreign language is
αi in country i and αj in country j. Then, in country i, only those individuals whose cost
level θ satisfies
Nj − ciθ ≥ αjNj (3)
will learn the language of country j. Indeed, since for those individuals, (2) is at least as large
as (1), learning generates larger benefits than non-learning. If, in addition, Nj − ci < αjNj,
then the individual with the highest learning costs (θ=1) does not study and there exists a
cut-off value θ(αj) ∈ (0, 1) such that the individual with type θ(αj) is indifferent between
4
studying and foregoing the study of language j. Thus, all individuals whose value of learning
cost is lower than θ(αj) will study the foreign language. If Nj − ci ≥ αjNj, then everybody
in population i studies language j. Thus, we can define the value
θ (αj) = min[(1− αj)Nj
ci
, 1], (4)
which identifies the highest level of learning costs in population i that still makes it beneficial
to study language j. Similarly, the inequality
Ni − cjθ ≥ αiNi (5)
identifies those types of individuals in population j who gain from studying language i. This
defines θ (αi) such that
θ (αi) = min[(1− αi)Ni
cj
, 1]. (6)
Imposing self-fulfilling expectations in equilibrium, the fraction of citizens of country j whom
citizens in country i expect to learn their language is equal to the fraction of those who
effectively do so. Therefore, in equilibrium, we obtain:
θ (αj) = αi and θ (αi) = αj. (7)
An important role in our analysis is played by the ratio
bji =
Nj
ci
, (8)
which represents thecost adjusted gross communicative benefit of a citizen in i from learning
language j. Similarly, the value bij represents the cost adjusted gross communicative benefit
of a citizen in j who learns language i:
bij =
Ni
cj
. (9)
Thus, taking into account (4), (6), (7), (8) and (9), a linguistic equilibrium is determined
by the system of equations {
min [bji (1− αj), 1] = αi
min [bij(1− αi), 1] = αj.
(10)
We shall focus here on the characterization of equilibria in the linguistic game considered
above.4 In particular, we examine the existence of interior and corner equilibria, where a pair(
α∗i , α
∗
j
)
is an interior equilibrium if 0 < α∗i , α
∗
j < 1, while in a corner equilibrium, either α
∗
i
or α∗j is equal to 0 or 1.
4The existence of a linguistic equilibrium (and the solution of (10)) can be derived from Schmeidler (1973)
and Selten and Pool (1991).
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Notice that both interior and corner equilibria can be observed. In an interior equilibrium,
several languages coexist, where, obviously, the fraction of those who speak one or the other
may be unequal. This is the case in most European countries (Belgium, Ireland, Finland,
Switzerland, for example, which all have several official languages spoken by sizeable groups
of people) as well as in the United States, where Spanish places itself next to English in several
states (California, Texas and Florida), and Canada. On the other hand, the disappearance of
many languages points to the possibility of corner solutions. In the next section we examine
both interior and corner equilibria.
3 Characterization of equilibria
We first analyze interior equilibria, for which system (10) yields:{
bji (1− αj) = αi
bij(1− αi) = αj,
(11)
or  αj +
αi
bji
= 1
αi +
αj
bij
= 1.
(12)
An examination of (12) and the sign of the expression αi + αj − 1 immediately shows that
the unique interior equilibrium will emerge if and only if either bji and b
i
j are both smaller
than 1 (Figure 1), or both larger than 1 (Figure 2). In both cases, the interior solution can
be written as:
α∗i =
bji (1− bij)
1− bji bij
; α∗j =
bij(1− bji )
1− bji bij
. (13)
Moreover, if bji = b
i
j = 1, any pair (α
∗
i , α
∗
j ) with α
∗
i + α
∗
j = 1 and 0 < α
∗
i , α
∗
j < 1 is an interior
linguistic equilibrium. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 - Interior equilibria. An interior equilibrium exists if and only if (i) bji , b
i
j <
1 or (ii) bji , b
i
j > 1, or (iii) b
j
i = b
i
j = 1. In cases (i) and (ii) there is a unique interior
equilibrium, whereas in case (iii) there is a continuum of interior equilibria.
Equilibrium (i) and (ii) have different stability properties. This the subject of Proposition
2.
Proposition 2 - Stability properties of interior equilibria. If bji , b
i
j < 1, then the inte-
rior equilibrium is (globally) stable. If bji , b
i
j > 1, the interior equilibrium is unstable.
The intuition for this result is quite simple. If the cost adjusted gross communicative benefits bji
and bij are not too large (smaller than 1, given the parametrization that is used in the model),
both languages will coexist. Only those types of individuals with small enough θ (that is,
high learning ability) will acquire the other language. If on the contrary, the communicative
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benefit, say for population i, is large (larger than 1), then all individuals will learn the foreign
language. This also explains why the interior solution is unstable in that case.
Note that, by (13), one obtains
α∗i − α∗j =
bji − bij
1− bji bij
,
which implies that in the stable interior equilibrium, the fraction of learners in a country that
faces larger communicative benefits is higher than in its counterpart.
Proposition 3 - Number of learners and communicative benefits. Let bji , b
i
j < 1 and
(α∗i , α
∗
j ) be a stable interior equilibrium. Then α
∗
i < α
∗
j if and only if b
j
i < b
i
j.
Thus if language j yields larger communicative benefits than language i, more individuals
with the prior knowledge of i will learn j than the reverse: “the value of assimilation is larger
to an individual from a small minority than to one from a large minority group” (Lazear,
1997). Belgium is a good example. Though Dutch (Flemish) is nowadays the native language
of more inhabitants than French, adding the neighboring French and Dutch populations leads
to 2.9 times more speakers of French than of Dutch.5 Assuming that the learning costs cF
and cD are equal, the fraction of Dutch-speaking Belgians who learn French should be larger
than that of French-speaking citizens who learn Dutch. The Eurobarometer survey (see INRA,
2001) indeed shows that 40 percent of the Dutch-speaking Belgian population claim they know
French, while only 12 percent of those who speak French know Dutch. A similar situation
prevails in Canada, where only 10 percent of Anglophones know French (Bond, 2001), whereas,
according to the 2001 Census results, 41 percent of Francophones know English. Naturally,
the roles of English and French are reversed in Que´bec, where, again according to the 2001
Census, some 43 percent of residents whose mother tongue is English, can communicate in
French.
Interior equilibria lead to some interesting comparative statics results, summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 - Comparative statics. The fraction of individuals studying the other lan-
guage is:
(i) decreasing in the learning cost of the other language;
(ii) increasing in the learning cost of its own language;
(iii) increasing in the population size of the other country;
(iv) decreasing in its own population size.
However,
(v) the relationship between the total number of individuals studying the other language
and the size of their own population is indeterminate. In most cases the correlation is
positive, unless bji is “very small” and b
i
j is “very large”, that is, when learning language
j provides a very limited communicative benefit for population i. Then, an increase in
their population does not produce new learners because the communicative benefits are
outweighed by the cost considerations.
5This ratio increases to 5.3 if one includes citizens who speak French and Dutch in the European Union.
See Ginsburgh and Weber (2005) and Ginsburgh et al. (2005b).
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We now turn to corner solutions. Note that if bji and b
i
j are both larger than 1 (Figure 2),
or both equal to 1, the two corner solutions, (1, 0) or (0, 1), also satisfy (13), and both are
linguistic equilibria. In some other cases (the one represented in Figure 3, for example), there
exist only corner solutions. The useful tool to understand corner equilibria is the following.
Lemma 5. The pair (1, 0) is a linguistic equilibrium if and only if bji ≥ 1. Similarly, the pair
(0, 1) is a linguistic equilibrium if and only if bij ≥ 1.
The lemma claims that if communicative benefits faced by one country are sufficiently high,
then the situation where all citizens in that country learn the foreign language, whereas nobody
in the other one does, is a linguistic equilibrium. Recall that every linguistic equilibrium is a
solution of (10). By examining this system, it is easy to distinguish two cases: either bji or b
i
j
is larger than 1, and the other is smaller than 1; or bji or b
i
j is larger than 1, and the other
is equal to 1. In the two first cases, there exists a unique corner equilibrium. In the two last
cases both pairs (0, 1) and (1, 0) constitute an equilibrium. We summarize the results in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 - Corner equilibria. (i) If either bji < 1 < b
i
j, or b
i
j < 1 < b
j
i , there is a
unique corner equilibrium.
(ii) If either bji = 1 < b
i
j, or b
i
j = 1 < b
j
i , there are two corner equilibria, (0, 1) and (1, 0).
Indeed, if every individual in population i studies language j, then every individual in pop-
ulation j is guaranteed the maximal possible communication benefit at no cost, and there is
no reason for any of them to study language i. This also rules out (1, 1) as an equilibrium
candidate. However, if no citizen of j studies language i, then the entire population of i studies
language j only if their communicative benefit is sufficiently large, that is if bji ≥ 1. By a
similar token, the corner solution (0, 0) cannot be an equilibrium either. Indeed, if nobody in
population i, say, learns language j, then those with small θ in population j should learn i.
The results presented in Propositions 1 and 6 are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Characterization of linguistic equilibria.
bij < 1 b
i
j = 1 b
i
j > 1
bji < 1 stable (0,1) (0,1)
interior
bji = 1 (1,0) continuum with (0,1), (1, 0)
αi + αj = 1
bji > 1 (1,0) (0,1), (1, 0) (0,1), (1,0) and
unstable interior
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4 Efficiency
Following our discussion on communicative benefits, we define the welfare of population i
as its aggregate communicative benefit:
Wi(αi, αj) = (1− αi)Ni(Ni + αjNj) + αiNi(Ni +Nj)− ci
∫ αiNi
0
θ
Ni
dθ, (14)
where the first term is the welfare of the (1−αi)Ni citizens who do not learn language j; each
of them gets a benefit equal to (Ni+αjNj), since they can communicate with that number of
i-speakers. The second term describes the net benefit of i-citizens who learn j; their number
is αiNi, and the gross benefit that each of them gets is (Ni +Nj); the third terms is the total
cost of those who learn. The expression can be rewritten as
Wi(αi, αj) = N
2
i +NiNj[(1− αi)αj + αi]−
1
2
ciα
2
iNi, (15)
where the welfare of population j, Wj(αi, αj) obtains by interchanging i and j in (15).
We examine two scenarios, starting with the one in which the two countries maximize their
joint welfare
W (αi, αj) = Wi(αi, αj) +Wj(αi, αj). (16)
After some simplifications, (16) can be rewritten as
W (αi, αj) = N
2
i +N
2
j + 2NiNj(αi + αj − αiαj)−
1
2
ciα
2
iNi −
1
2
cjα
2
jNj,
or
W (αi, αj) = N
2
i +N
2
j + cicj
[
2bji b
i
j(αi + αj − αiαj)−
1
2
α2i b
i
j −
1
2
α2jb
j
i
]
. (17)
By differentiating W with respect to each of the variables, the first order conditions yield
the following equations: {
min [2bji (1− α0j ), 1] = α0i
min [2bij(1− α0i ), 1] = α0j ,
(18)
where (α0i , α
0
j ) are such that
W (α0i , α
0
j ) = max
(αi,αj)∈S2
W (αi, αj).
For every αi the function W (αi, ·) is concave in αj, and for every αj, W (·, αj) is concave in
αi, but W (·, ·) is not concave over the unit square [0, 1]2, conditions (18) are necessary but
not sufficient to determine a maximum of the function W . However, if the solution of (18) is
unique (which will be the case for an interior optimum), it will also be welfare maximizing.6
We have
6Note that the only difference between (18) and (10) is the coefficient 2 in the left-hand side.
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Proposition 7 - Efficient allocations. (i) If bji , b
i
j < 1/2, the unique efficient allocation is
interior.
(ii) If bji ≤ 1/2 ≤ bij and bij > bji , then (0, 1) is the only efficient allocation.
(iii) If bij ≤ 1/2 < bji and bji > bij, then (1, 0) is the only efficient allocation.
(iv) If bij = b
j
i = 1/2, then there there exists a continuum of efficient allocations, satis-
fying αi + αj = 1.
(v) If bij > b
j
i > 1/2 then the only efficient allocation is (0, 1).
(vi)If bji > b
i
j > 1/2, then the only efficient allocation is (1, 0).
(vii)If bij = b
j
i > 1/2, then both (0, 1) and (1, 0) are efficient allocations.
Efficient outcomes are given in Table 2.
Table 2. Efficient number of learners
bij <
1
2
bij =
1
2
bij >
1
2
bji <
1
2
interior (0, 1) (0, 1)
allocation
bji =
1
2
(1, 0) continuum with (0, 1)
αi + αj = 1
bji >
1
2
(1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) or (1, 0)
It turns out that too little learning may occur in equilibrium, and that policy intervention
may be needed.
Proposition 8 - Insufficient learning. (i) If bji , b
i
j < 1/2, the number of learners in equi-
librium is smaller than in the unique interior efficient allocation.
(ii) If bji = b
i
j = 1/2, there exists an efficient allocation in which the number of learners
in both countries is larger than in the unique interior equilibrium.
It is worth pointing out that joint optimization could be quite a restrictive assumption.
Indeed, one may argue that each country or region will rather maximize the welfare of its own
citizens. It is, for example, quite difficult to coordinate the educational systems, and jointly
decide on the amount of subsidies needed to reduce the learning cost of the other language.
In this case, country i will choose αi to maximize Wi(αi, αj) and country j will likewise set
αj to maximize Wj(αi, αj). It is easy to check that this Nash game yields the same solution
as the decentralized solution of Section 3. Indeed, first-order conditions are identical and
each country’s learning strategy is to have only individuals with positive net communicative
10
benefits learning the foreign language. However, this requirement is consistent with individual
incentives that lead to the same outcome, namely the linguistic equilibrium. This implies
that only coordination between the countries can lead to more efficient solutions. Thus, the
difficulties of cooperation and coordination notwithstanding, some steps in this direction could
be rather beneficial.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies a model of language learning and provides a full characterization of
linguistic equilibria and their welfare properties for the two-languages case. The heterogene-
ity assumption on the ability to learn a foreign language generates interior equilibria, thus
extending the existing results by Church and King (1993) and Shy (2001) who have examined
corner solutions in a homogenous framework.
We also show that the interior stable equilibrium may lead to insufficient learning, and that
subsidies or other forms of intervention may be needed to curb learning costs. But there are
examples (Lazear, 1997) that show that it may be rational and welfare improving to protect a
language by taxing the learning of the foreign language. There are also circumstances where
a unique standard (in our case, a corner solution) may be welfare deteriorating.
Transfers from one country to the other7 may change the equilibrium outcomes. The
welfare consequences of those policies8 could also be tackled in the framework of our model.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: To examine the stability of the system (11), assume that the initial
conditions (αj,0, αi,0) of the following dynamic system do not constitute an equilibrium:{
αj,t = b
i
j(1− αi,t−1)
αi,t = b
j
i (1− αj,t−1).
(19)
This is a linear system which can also be written as:
αt = b+ Γαt−1,
where α = (αj, αi) and b = (b
i
j, b
j
i ) are column vector of two elements each, and Γ is the
2× 2-matrix
Γ =
(
0 −bij
−bji 0
)
.
It is easy to check that the characteristic roots of this matrix are equal to
√
bijb
j
i and -
√
bijb
j
i .
If bji , b
i
j < 1 (Figure 1), the absolute value of both roots is smaller than 1, and this (unique)
equilibrium is (globally) stable.
7For instance, schools financed by the French government in foreign countries and the network of Goethe
Institutes which promote the German language and culture outside of Germany.
8See also Pool (1991) and Van Parijs (2004).
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However, if bji , b
i
j > 1 (Figure 2), the interior equilibrium is unstable, and, depending on
the initial condition (αj,0, αi,0), the dynamic system (19) will converge to one or the other
corner solution.
Proof of Proposition 4: We compute the partial derivatives of α∗i with respect to b
j
i = Nj/ci,
bij = Ni/cj. Similar results can be derived for the equilibrium position of the other language.
(i) holds for Nj fixed, and (iii) holds for ci fixed, since
dα∗i
dbji
=
(1− bij)(1− bji bij) + bji (1− bij)bij
(1− bji bij)2
=
1− bij
(1− bji bij)2
.
(ii) holds for Ni fixed, and (iv) holds for cj fixed, since
dα∗i
dbij
=
−bji (1− bji bij) + (bji )2(1− bij)
(1− bji bij)2
=
bji (b
i
j − 1)
(1− bji bij)2
< 0.
Finally, to prove (v), we compute
d(α∗iNi)
dNi
=
d(α∗i b
i
j)
dbij
=
bji (1− 2bij)(1− bji bij) + (bji )2bij(1− bij)
(1− bji bij)2
=
bji (1− 2bij + (bjj)2bji )
(1− bji bij)2
.
The sign of the last expression is indeterminate. It is, however, nonnegative outside of the
following set {
(bji , b
i
j) ∈ S2|bij ≥
2bji − 1
(bji )
2
}
,
which is a subset of the two-dimensional unit square{
(bji , b
i
j) ∈ <2|0 ≤ bji ≤ 1, 0 ≤ bij ≤ 1
}
.
Proof of Proposition 7: (i) follows from the fact that the system (18) has a unique solution,
which is an interior allocation.
(ii)-(iii). If either bji ≤ 1/2 ≤ bij with bij > bji or bij ≤ 1/2 ≤ bji with bji > bij, then only solution
or solutions of (18) are the corner ones. The choice between (0, 1) and (1, 0) (if there is one)
is determined by the sign of the following expression
W (1, 0)−W (0, 1) = b
j
i − bij
2
. (20)
(iv) follows from the fact that every pair (αi, αj) with αi+αj = 1 represents a solution of (11).
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(v) Let bji , b
i
j > 1/2. We claim that the maximal welfare is attained at either (1, 0) or at
(0, 1), depending on the sign of (19).
Let us compare W (0, 1),W (1, 0) and W (α0i , α
0
j ), where the latter is the interior solution
of (11). Denote
B = bji b
i
j, b = b
j
i + b
i
j.
Then
α0i =
4B − 2bji
4B − 1 , α
0
j =
4B − 2bij
4B − 1 . (21)
Using (21), it suffices to consider the maximization of the following expression:
W˜ (αi, αj) = 2B(αi + αj − αiαj)− 1
2
α2i b
i
j −
1
2
α2jb
j
i .
Then
W˜ (α0i , α
0
j ) = 2B
(
8B − 2b
4B − 1 −
16B2 + 4B − 8Bb
(4B − 1)2
)
− (4B − 2b
j
i )
2bij
2(4B − 1)2
−(4B − 2b
j
i )
2bji
2(4B − 1)2 =
32B3 − 8B2 + 2Bb− 8B2b
(4B − 1)2 =
2B(4B − b)
4B − 1 .
In order to show that
W˜ (α0i , α
0
j ) < max[W˜ (1, 0), W˜ (0, 1)],
it suffices to demonstrate that
W˜ (α0i , α
0
j ) <
W˜ (1, 0) + W˜ (0, 1)
2
.
Indeed, W˜ (1, 0) = 2B − 1
2
bij, W˜ (0, 1) = 2B − 12bji , and
W˜ (1, 0) + W˜ (0, 1)
2
= 2B − b
4
.
Thus, it remains to show that
2B(4B − b)
4B − 1 < 2B −
b
4
,
or
b
4
> (2− b)B.
If b ≥ 2, this inequality trivially holds. Let b < 2. Since 1 > b(2 − b) for all 1 < b < 2, we
have
b
4
> (2− b)b
2
4
.
Note that if the sum of two positive numbers is b, then their product is maximal if they are
equal. Thus,
b
4
> (2− b) b
2
4
≥ (2− b)B.
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Proof of Proposition 8: Let bji , b
i
j) < 1/2. Then the linguistic equilibrium (α
∗
i , α
∗
j ) is given
by bji (1− bij)
1− bji bij
,
bij(1− bji )
1− bji bij
 ,
whereas the efficient outcome, (α0i , α
0
j ), is determined by (21). Take country i. It easy to
verify that α∗i < α
0
i , or
bji (1− bij)
1− bji bij
<
2bji (1− 2bij)
1− 4bji bij
.
Similar derivations are valid for country j.
(ii) If bji = b
i
j = 1/2, the linguistic equilibrium is (1/3, 1/3). The welfare optimizing
solutions are represented by the pairs (αi, αj) with αi + αj = 1. Then every point in the set
{(αi, αj) ∈ <2|αi + αj = 1, αi, αj > 1/3}
and, in particular, (1/2, 1/2) is superior to the interior equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium
indeed could exhibit an insufficient level of learning.
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